Publication

Emulating Wide Area Communication Networks for Testing Cyber Attack Scenarios

Alex Reyna; Meghan Sahakian; Ryan Elliott; Samuel Ojetola

2026
2026 IEEE Texas Power and Energy Conference (TPEC)
Publisher / DOI

Abstract

This work focuses on the resilience of wide area communication networks in power systems against cyber-related vulnerabilities, emphasizing the critical role of accurate timestamped measurements for voltage phasor data in maintaining voltage stability across geographically dispersed transmission networks. Utilizing the SCEPTRE framework, the study emulates communication networks to test the effectiveness of Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) under various operational scenarios, including simulated cyber-attacks. The design and implementation of a virtual test network using Distributed Network Protocol 3.0 (DNP3) are discussed, highlighting the challenges of latency and scalability in emulation practices. Key findings reveal vulnerabilities to attacks such as ARP spoofing and Man-in-the-Middle attacks, providing preliminary insights into their potential impact on system stability and communication integrity. The results underscore the necessity for robust cybersecurity measures in critical energy infrastructure to enhance the reliability and security of wide area RAS operations.

AI Summary

This paper develops a cyber-physical emulation framework for testing how communication-network attacks can affect wide-area remedial action schemes in power systems. Using Sandia’s SCEPTRE platform, a virtual network of PMU and RAS/PDC devices was coupled with a MATLAB/PSTess simulation of the miniWECC system, with DNP3/TCP used to exchange timestamped voltage-magnitude and phase-angle measurements and with timing parameters tuned to reduce closed-loop communication latency from roughly 1.2 seconds to about 43 milliseconds in a three-PMU case. The framework was then used to test denial-of-service and ARP-spoofing/man-in-the-middle attacks during a multi-stage grid disturbance; the DoS attempt was largely ineffective in the tested setup, while a MitM attack launched during the disturbance blocked RAS operation and led to system instability and simulation shutdown. When the same attack was initiated after the RAS had already acted, measurement accuracy degraded and communication timing diverged, but the system remained stable. The results show that both attack timing and communication latency are critical to evaluating cyber-physical risk in wide-area protection and control, and the work provides a scalable testbed foundation for future studies involving larger virtual networks, additional protocols, and intrusion-detection or mitigation tools.

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